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STUDENT NOTES
RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISTAKES IN APPLICATION
MADE BY AGENTS OF INSURANCE COMPANY
A typical problem in the field of insurance, and one which
is constantly arising, involves the interesting question, to what ex-
tent an insurance company by an express limitation upon the
agent's authority inserted in the application may escape liability
for the fraudulent or accidental mistakes of such agent made while
soliciting and preparing applications for insurance? An appli-
cant for insurance truthfully answers all questions propounded
by the soliciting agent or medical examiner but untrue answers
are inserted in the application by such agents. The applicant signs
the application without reading and without knowledge of the
falsity of any of the answers. In an action by the beneficiary to
recover on the insurance policy the insurance company defends on
the ground of a material misrepresentation in the application. Tn
the absence of any restrictions or limitations upon the agent's
authority, the law is well established that information correctly
communicated to the agent will be imputed to the principal and
the company will be estopped to set up the defense of misrepre-
sentation.' As one court stated, "The business of insurance be-
ing transacted almost exclusively by agents the maxim, qui facit
per alium facit per se, applies with peculiar force to their acts."'
It is only natural that insurance companies have constantly sought
some device by which to escape the burden of this rule. One of
the first means invented was the insertion of a provision in the
application or policy that the agent in preparing the application
was to be regarded as the agent of the insured and not as agent of
the company. These provisions were promptly declared invalid
by the courts as being contrary to fact and a mere attempt to
create an agency which never existed.' While such sweeping pro-
visions are no longer in use in the insurance policy, the companies
have attempted to offset the general rule by a partial limitation
on the agent's authority, inserting in the application a statement
to the effect that,
1 The cases upholding this view are collected in Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 833.
2 Aetna Live Stock F. & T. Ins. Co. v. Olmstead, 21 Mich. 246 (1870).
3 Deitz v. Insurance Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. 816 (1888); Coles v. Jeffer-
son Insurance Company, 41 W. Va. 261, 23 S. E. 732 (1895); Pierce v. The
People, 106 I1. 11 (1883); In Kausal v. Minnesota Farmers' Ins. Co., 31
Minn. 17, 16 N. W. 430 (1883), the court in speaking of such a limitation
states, "There is no magic in mere words to change the real into the unreal.
A device of words cannot be imposed upon the court in the place of an actuality
of fact."
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"The agent taking this application has no authority to
make, modify, or discharge contracts or waive any of the
company's rights or requirements, and the company shall not
be charged with knowledge on the part of the medical agents
or other representative of any information called for by any
question contained in this application unless made a part
hereof or indorsed hereon."
Although a similar provision is almost universally adopted by
the insurance companies there is by no means unanimity among
the courts whether this limitation will be upheld.4  In the federal
courts and almost half the states the rule is that such a limitation
is valid and will be binding on the applicant who signs the appli-
cation.5 This rule, commonly known as the federal rule, is be-
lieved to have had its origin in the Connecticut case of Ryan v.
World Life Insurance Companyu which was cited with approval in
the first federal case upholding the limitation. T  In the Fletcher
case, which is probably the leading case on the subject, Justice
Field stated the rule in these words:
"Here the power of the agent was limited and notice of
such limitation given by being embodied in the application,
which the assured was required to make and sign, and which,
as we have stated, he must be presumed to have read. He is
therefore bound by his statements."
Despite the great weight to which the Fletcher case and other
cases so holding are entitled, it is believed that the federal rule is
fallacious in that it ignores the true nature of the insurance con-
tract. Under this view the applicant and the insurer are treated
4 Mr. Vance in his text, VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), states the over-
whelming weight of American authority to be that such limitations are in-
valid. At one time this statement correctly stated the rule for only the federal
courts and a very few state courts permitted such limitations. However, it is
submitted that the trend of recent decisions is in favor of such limitations
and the courts at present time are almost evenly divided upon the question.
For a comprehensive collection of the cases see note in (1931) 81 A. L. R.
333. Also see Note (1924) 18 Ir. L. REv. 377.
5 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 (1886); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 34 F. (2d) 215 (W. D. Missouri, 1929); Shamblen v. Mod-
ern Woodmen, 105 W. Va. 252, 142 S. E. 447 (1928); Dimick v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 69 N. T. L. 384, 55 Atl. 291 (1903); Forwood v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 117 Md. 254, 83 Atl. 169 (1912) ; Minsker v. John Hancock Life Ins.
Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930); Koppleman v. Commercial Casualty
Co., 302 Pa. 106, 153 Atl. 121 (1930) ; Salvate v. Freman's Ins. Co., 42 R. I.
433, 108 Atl. 579 (1920); Ryan v. World Ins. Co., 41 Conn. 168 (1874); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Patten, 151 Ga. 185, 106 S. E. 183 (1920); Iverson, v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co., 151 Cal. 746, 91 Pac. 609 (1907).
6 41 Conn. 168 (1874).
7 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 (1886).
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as though negotiating an ordinary bargain and sale. The parties
are regarded as being capable of making any restrictions and
imposing any limitations which they may see fit. The applicant
is charged with notice of the limitations on the agent's authority
and is held to be under a duty to read the application.8 Failure
to read the application and to discover the fraud or mistake places
the applicant in the position of being a party to the fraud.9 To
summarize the situation, at every step of the way the applicant
is held vigorously to the rule, "Vigilantibius et non domientibus
jura subveniunt."''
Almost diametrically opposed to these decisions is the rule
which prevails in a majority of the state courts and which holds
such limitations to be of no effect." Courts adopting this view
have taken a more realistic approach to the problem and have
tended to look at the true conditions which surround the formation
of the insurance contract. The courts recognize that insurance
companies have sent out their agents to solicit insurance from peo-
ple who have little understanding of the subject of insurance and
the rules which govern its negotiation. Applicants for insurance
are generally clear on one or two points which the agent promises
to protect, but for everything else they must sign ready-made ap-
plications and accept ready-made policies, carefully concocted to
conserve the interests of the company. The agent in preparing the
application negotiates for the company, asks questions for the com-
pany, and makes returns for the company. The average applicant
for insurance regards the signing of the application as a mere mat-
ter of form and relies upon the agent's superior knowledge con-
8 Dimick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 69 N. J. L. 384, 55 Ati. 291 (1903);
Rinker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 214 Pa. 608, 64 Atl. 82 (1906); Koppleman v.
Ins. Co., 302 Pa. 106, 153 AtI. 121 (1930); Globe Life Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 76 Md.
293, 25 Atl. 227 (1892); Forwood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 117 Md. 254, 83 Ati.
169 (1912).
9 Supra n. 8.
20 Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245 (1911).
"Howe v. Provident Fund Soc., 7 Ind. App. 583, 34 N. E. 830 (1893);
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Grady, 185 N. C. 384, 117 S. E. 289 (1923); Schuler v.
Mutual Ins. Co., 191 Mo. App. 52, 176 S. W. 274 (1915)'; Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Van Fleet, 47 Colo. 401, 107 Pac. 1087 (1910); Parno v. Iowa Mer-
chants' Ins. Co., 114 Iowa 132, 86 N. W. 210 (1901); Royal Neighbors of
America v. Boman, 177 Ill. 27, 52 N. E. 264 (1898) ; Tubbs v. Dwelling-House
Ins. Co., 84 Mich. 646, 48 N. W. 296 (1891); Mutual Aid Union v. Blaclnall,
129 Ark. 450, 196 S. W. 792 (1917); Shinn v. National Travelers Benefit
Ass'n, 102 Kan. 134, 169 Pac. 215 (1917); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. White-
head, 73 Okla. 71, 174 Pac. 784 (1918); Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763 (1902), overruled in Minsker v. John Hancock
Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930).
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cerning all matters mentioned therein. Under such circumstances
it is not carelessness or imprudence for the applicant to assume
that the agent will accurately and truthfully set down the results
of the negotiations.'12  Under this view of the insurance contract,
courts reach the conclusion that the whole subject is to be regarded
as sui gencris and the rules governing the formation of ordinary
contracts are held not to apply. Whether the agent acts for the
company and whether his acts and knowledge will bind the com-
pany are to be determined by settled legal principles rather than
by stipulations contained in the application.'3 Being more in
accord with the facts this view for that reason reaches a more de-
sirable result.
The law in West Virginia upon this issue is apparently well
settled. Our court holds in accordance with the majority view
that in the absence of any limitation upon the agent's authority
his knowledge and his acts committed within the apparent scope
of his authority are binding upon the company.'4 Likewise, any
limitation on the agent's authority contained in the policy or in
the company's by-laws is held invalid in so far as it relates to mat-
ters arising prior to the inception of the insurance contract.1" In
the case of Shamblin v. Modern Woodmen," however, the court
definitely declares that any limitation on the agent's authority in-
serted in the application will be valid and binding upon the appli-
cant. In the ease of Dickinson v. Pacific Insurance Company,"r
the most recent decision on this point, the applicant relied upon
the advice of the company's medical agent that a past illness was
so trivial that it need not be mentioned in the application. The
application contained a provision that the agent could not bind the
company by his knowledge unless such were made a part of the
application. Although the point arose only by way of dictum, the
West Virginia court is apparently undecided as to how far the
rule of the Shamblin case should apply to this situation. It is
submitted that in such a case the rule of the Shamblin case should
be limited. The court might well draw a distinction between a
12 Royal Neighbors of America v. Boman, 177 Il. 27, 52 N. E. 264 (1888).
13 Supra n. 11.
14 McCall v. Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co., 9 W. Va. 237 (1876); Schwarzbach v.
Protective Union, 25 W. Va. 622 (1885); Shinn v. Insurance Co., 104 W. Va.
353, 140 S. E. 61 (1927).
15 Deitz v. Insurance Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. 816 (1888); Medley v. In-
surance Co., 55 W. Va. 342, 47 S. E. 101 (1904).
16 105 W. Va. 252, 142 S. E. 447 (1928).
17 188 S. E. 378 (W. Va. 1936).
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limitation imposed upon the authority of an ordinary agent and
that imposed upon the authority of the medical agent. Such a
distinction has been pointed out by other courts 8 and, far from
being nebulous, is well founded in fact. An applicant for insur-
ance may refuse to rely upon an ordinary agent of the company
and may fill out his own application or may seek help from others
in doing so. But in the case of the medical examiner, the company
very properly insists on the right to select the agent, and the
applicant has no choice. Further, the medical examination and
the answering of the medical questions often involves a degree of
professional skill and knowledge which only the medical agent
possesses. Under these circumstances it would not seem an undue
hardship upon the company to insist that the applicant have the
right despite all limitations in the application to rely upon the
statements and opinion of the medical examiner.
W. V. R.
is In Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763
(1902), the distinction between a medical agent and the ordinary soliciting
agent is clearly pointed out. See also Dimick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
75 N. J. L. 822, 69 AtI. 176 (1903); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Robison,
58 Fed. 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893).
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